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Abstract. This article analyses the online communication of the Estonian extreme right 
that appears to be characterized by an echo-chamber effect as well as enclosed and 
hermetic meaning-making. The discussion mainly relies on the theoretical frameworks 
offered by semiotics of culture. 
One of the aims of the article is to widen the scope of understanding of 
autocommunicative processes that are usually related to learning, insight and 
innovation. The article shows the conditions in which autocommunicative processes 
result in closed interactions, based on reproducing stereotypes and redundant content. 
We detect antithetical meaning-making, an orientation towards normative (“correct”) 
texts and the prevalence of phatic communication as the main dominants that guide 
closed autocommunication. Such communication leads to polarization of dissimilar 
views and hinders dialogue. Our case study focuses on the discussion that arose in the 
context of the European Refugee Crisis that started in spring 2015.
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The World Wide Web has given individuals an unprecedented chance to choose 
between different resources of communication and information and to construct 
their own packages of meaning that meet their interests. The availability of various 
institutional, as well as vernacular and hybrid, sources has grown exponentially. On the 
one hand, such diversification makes it possible to approach different viewpoints and 
various ways of constructing a message (Downey, Fenston 2003: 194; Chadwick 2009), 
yet on the other hand it creates a breeding ground for quite homogeneous interaction. 
Several researchers have pointed out that in the context of contemporary grassroots 
media the phenomenon of selective exposure has emerged: the online sphere gives 
an individual the possibility to operate in a rather hermetic space of meaning that 
suits his/her previously existing viewpoints; contacts with information that may 
include ideas that cause feelings of reluctance and perplexity are kept to a minimum 
(Grömping 2014: 44; Stroud 2010: 556; Sunstein 2009: 80). 
Folklorist and media researcher Robert Glenn Howard has elaborated the concept 
of ‘vernacular web’ in order to explain the grassroots networks that surround certain 
web pages. According to Howard, one important characteristic of the vernacular 
web is that it is dominated by ideas that reproduce continuities and consistencies 
with the already existing values of the participants. In time the shared values will 
become more coherent and persistent (Howard 2008; 2013: 82). It is quite likely that 
individuals whose views “would ordinarily dissolve” (Sunstein 2009: 81) due to being 
very different from the normative perspectives are finding like-minded vernacular 
communities on the Internet. All they have to do is just google the “correct” key-words 
(Sunstein 2009: 81; Wojcieszak 2010: 641). Many studies concentrating on the level of 
the deliberative discussions in vernacular communities (see Grömping 2014; Kushin, 
Kitchener 2009; Stroud 2010; Van Alstyne, Brynjolfsson 2005; Sunstein 2009) have 
reached the alarming conclusion that this kind of communication is dominated by 
the echo-chamber effect. The echo-chamber effect indicates that constant interaction 
with similar interlocutors leads to polarization of opinions and fixation of shared 
views and preconceptions. Individuals who navigate in the sphere of influence of the 
echo chambers tend to accept only the narrow chains of causalities that justify their 
already existing views. Information that is dissimilar or controversial in view with 
those explanations is ignored as irrelevant or dubious (Wojcieszak 2010: 649). 
This article approaches the problem of echo chambers by analysing vernacular 
online communication of the Estonian extreme right. Hitherto, the Estonian example 
has been studied by relatively few authors (see Madisson, Ventsel 2015, 2016; Siibak 
2012; 2014; Jakobson et al. 2012). Several studies concentrating on grassroots 
communities of the extreme right have indicated that the rise of enclosed and polarized 
interactions emerges as an important trend (see Askanius, Mylonas 2015; Hirvonen 
2013; Wojcieszak 2010). This tendency has been referred to as an “informational 
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cocoon that precludes all kind of reality checks” (Griffin 2003: 45); “communities 
of closure or anti-public” (Cammaerts 2009: 556–558) and “filter bubbles that are 
amplifying the extreme right ideology” (O’Callaghan et al. 2013, 20151). Studies also 
outline that, paradoxically, extreme-right echo-chamber communication is growing 
in an international dimension. Different extreme-right communities have become 
informed about one another’s activities and developed a common identity discourse 
that is rhetorically anchored in the framework of translocal whiteness2 (Daniels 2009, 
2012; Caiani, Kröll 2014; Grumke 2013).
The researchers mentioned above have conducted quantitative and qualitative 
inquiries into mapping the most widespread topics in the vernacular webs of the 
extreme right, and analysed how the communication of the extreme right has become 
adapted to particular social networking sites such as YouTube, Twitter, Tumblr, 
Facebook, various forums, etc. However, the current research has not concentrated 
on explaining the specifics of meaning-making characteristic of these kinds of 
communities.  One of the aims of this article is filling in this gap and explicating the 
semiotic mechanisms upon which such hermetic communication is built. Primarily, 
we are relying on Juri Lotman’s framework of autocommunication3 and concentrate on 
identifying the dominants which rule, transform and determine the meaning-making 
and guarantee “the integrity of the structures” (Jakobson 1971a: 82). In our case study 
we analyse the discussion that emerged in the context of the European Refugee Crisis 
that escalated in April 2015.4 The topic became very urgent after the European Union 
introduced a quota system of distributing the migrants across the member states.5 We 
1 O’Callaghan, Derek; Greene, Derek; Conway, Maura; Carthy, Joe; Cunningham, Padraig 
2013. Th e Extreme Right Filter Bubble has been accessed at http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.6149.
2 Global online-communication facilitates the formation of a transnational and explicitly 
racist white identity, i.e. “translocal whiteness” (Daniels 2009: 43). Besides identifying with 
translocal whiteness, the network of the European extreme right usually shares a strong Euro-
skepticism (Caiani, Kröll 2015: 344–345) and Islamophobia (Askanius, Mylonas 2015) as 
common umbrella topics. 
3 We have very briefl y introduced the autocommunicative aspect of extreme-right online 
communication in previous articles (see Madisson, Ventsel 2015, 2016).
4 In Estonia, the public discussion of the Refugee Crisis was accompanied with public 
demonstrations and other manifestations that indicated dissent from the offi  cial statements of 
the European Union (e.g. a motorcycle hike to the Vao Refugee Centre). Th e most serious case 
was probably an arson attempt on the Refugee Centre in Vao on 3 September 2015.
5 Usually, the beginning of the European Refugee Crisis is associated with April 2015 when 
more than a thousand asylum seekers were drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Since then, 
European countries have tried to use various ways of action to get the crisis under control, e. g. 
a system of quotas has been created for distributing the refugees and migrants among diff erent 
member-states, many countries have been fortifying their borders, various programmes have 
been organized against human traffi  cking etc. 
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focus on the Estonian extreme right blogs (Rahvuslane, Koobas, EESTI RAHVUSLIK 
BLOG and BH RuZZland)6 that have covered the topic of the European Refugee 
Crisis in the most explicit and radical manner. These blogs function as important 
nodes of the Estonian extreme-right network: they share numerous links to various 
secondary sources such as web-pages, forums, social networking sites, etc., that share 
predominantly extreme-right or nationalistic content. It is important to note that the 
radicalism of the observed blog postings varies greatly and not all of the content of the 
blogs contains explicitly radical and xenophobic implications. However, the general 
tonality of the meaning-making of this vernacular web recognizably belongs to the 
extreme right.
Another purpose of our article is to widen the common understanding of 
the scope of autocommunicative processes. Lotman (2000: 21) has pointed 
out that autocommunication refers to specific meaning-making processes in 
which the addresser and the addressee overlap. He notes that his framework of 
autocommunication has been developed in a heuristic and sketchy manner, and 
stresses that there is a long way to go to achieve a grounded comparison between 
systems that are oriented towards autocommunication and those oriented towards 
communication (see Lotman: 2010: 73–74; Lotman 2000: 35). This article tries to 
shed some light on polarized hermetic autocommunication as an extreme version of 
cultural I-I communication. Although Lotman (2000: 35) notes that in some cases 
autocommunicative processes can impede cultural dynamics and facilitate the re-
production of cultural stereotypes, he never explicates this aspect more thoroughly, 
but rather focuses on the functions of autocommunicative processes that are related 
to learning, discovering and comprehending (Lotman 2000: 21–22, 24; see also Torop 
2008: 729). Most of the authors who have developed Lotman’s ideas further also seem 
to understand the autocommunication of semiotic unities as a mechanism which 
enables cultural innovation and allows subjects to establish their autonomy, e.g. the 
autonomy of the subject in relation to dominant discourses (see Ibrus 2010: 90; Ibrus, 
Torop 2015: 3; Schönle 2002: 432; Raudsepp, Ventsel 2015: 44–54). There are also 
several studies that view autocommunication as an identity-forming, auto-suggestive 
and/or therapeutic form of interaction which leads to the subject’s self-organization 
and to clarification of essential objectives and values (Han 2014: 527; Hartley 2015: 
83; Kallio, Sandström 2009: 84–85; Lindström 2010: 363). Those approaches see 
autocommunication through the prism of optimism – as something which may 
contribute to the development and well-being of an individual or a culture. As far as we 
know, only a few papers have described situations where autocommunicative processes 
result in enclosed interactions, based on reproducing stereotypes and redundant 
6 During the time of writing this article the blogs Koobas and EESTI RAHVUSLIK BLOG 
have been closed down.  
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content (Lepik 2007: 87–89; Madisson, Ventsel 2016; Ventsel 2016; Steedman 2006; 
Randviir in press)7.
Extreme-right online communication as closed 
autocommunication 
Culture can be treated as a sphere of organization (of information) in human society 
which, from an “inner” point of view, is opposed to the “outer” as disorganization 
(entropy) (Ivanov et. al 1998: 33–34). The ways in which relations are drawn with outer 
structures also significantly affect the specifics of intra-cultural meaning-making. 
Extreme-right communication forms a marginal part of cultural communication. Les 
Back (2002: 632) outlines the main traits of contemporary extreme right movements: 
“1) a rhetoric of racial and/or national uniqueness and common destiny; 2) ideas of 
racial supremacy, superiority and separation; 3) a repertoire of conceptions of racial 
Otherness; 4) a utopian revolutionary world-view that aims to overthrow the existing 
order”. In addition to these features, contemporary extreme-right meaning-making is 
also characterized by xenophobia, and by a strong opposition to political establishment 
and to the principles of pluralism and the fundamental equal rights between people 
(Rydgren 2010: 61–62).
According to Juri Lotman, cultural communication can, in general, be dominated 
by two basic tendencies. Firstly, there is outwardly directed communication which aims 
to transfer the sender’s views (message) and to find the widest possible intersection 
with other semiotic unities (I-he/she type of communication). Secondly, there is 
inwardly oriented communication which can be treated as autocommunication (i.e. I-I 
type of communication) (Lotman 2000: 21). In actual communication situations these 
types appear as intermingled, but on an analytical level it is possible to distinguish 
the domination of either the former or the latter type (Lotman 2000: 35). Lotman 
stresses that autocommuniative processes can primarily be observed in larger socio-
7 Our usage of the concept of ‘autocommunication’ partly overlaps with concepts used by 
other authors, e.g. ‘self-communication’ (Morris 1949) or ‘intrapersonal communication’ 
(Ruesch, Bateson 1951), etc. Although the distinction of those concepts would allow explicating 
analytical nuances, we have still decided to stick to Lotman’s concept. We do it fi rstly because 
Lotman’s theory presumes the homomorphism between various semiotic unities. Lotman has 
constantly emphasized that similar meaning-making processes are taking place on the level of 
the individual, but also on the level of broader dimensions (e.g. culture). Secondly, as one of our 
goals is to map the conceptual fi eld associated with the framework of autocommunication, the 
introduction of new notions could be misleading.  Developing that kind of distinction between 
the concepts of autocommunication and self-communication, intrapersonal communication 
could be the topic of another theoretical article. 
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cultural systems, e.g. at the level of a national community (Lotman 2010: 73). Thus, it 
is useful to analyse the categories of ‘I’ and ‘he/she’ also on a more abstract level than 
an individual. 
 According to Lotman (2000: 22), “[i]n the ‘I-I’ system the bearer of the information 
remains the same but the message is reformulated and acquires new meaning during 
the communication process. This is the result of introducing a supplementary, 
second, code; the original message is recoded into elements of its structure and 
thereby acquires features of a new message”. The information is reformulated in new 
structural categories. In ‘I-I’ communication there is a qualitative transformation of 
the system, the restructuring of the ‘I’ itself (Lotman 2000: 22, 28–29). Thanks to 
the new code it is possible to understand the previously known information from 
a novel perspective. Lotman points out that “[a]lthough the secondary code aims 
to liberate the primary signifying elements from their normal semantic values, this 
does not happen. The normal semantic values remain but secondary meanings are 
imposed on them […]”. Those secondary meanings are created by the semantic shifts 
that are caused when a new code is reformulating and renewing the status of the 
previously known message (Lotman 2000: 28). In autocommunicative meaning-
making, the culture (i.e., the abstract ‘me’ – M.-L. M., A. V.) is trying to grow its 
internal information, to improve the quality of this information, and to transform 
itself through this information (Torop 2008: 729). Thus, cultural autocommunication 
comprises in itself the reflection of an immediate identity or the habitual level but it 
also comprises the instructions for interpreting it, so I-I communication facilitates the 
creation of metalanguages and metatexts (Torop 2013: 125). The process of organizing 
and interpreting immediate identifications takes place through developing different 
languages of description (codes). In case of this process, the culture is trying to 
explain some topical phenomenon for itself and by doing so it is looking for various 
languages of description, which is also the reason why autocommunication becomes 
very significant in times of social crisis and other sensitive periods (see Lotman 2009: 
15; Ojamaa, Torop 2015: 64). 
Chris Atton (2006: 286) has indicated that extreme-right online communication 
is not usually characterized by ‘democratized creativity’ which is common for 
alternative media8 because it does not leave much room for critical argumentation 
8 According to Atton and Hamilton (2008: 1) “Alternative journalism proceeds from 
dissatis faction not only with the mainstream coverage of certain issues and topics, but also 
[...] emphasizes alternatives to, inter alia, conventions of news sources and representations; 
the inverted pyramid of news texts; the hierarchical and capitalized economy of commercial 
journalism; the professional, elite basis of journalism as a practice; the professional norm of 
objectivity; and the subordinate role of audience as receiver. Alternative media, at least its ideal 
form, is produced outside mainstream media institutions and networks”.
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and deliberative discussions. The extreme-right (auto)communication is an ongoing 
process of interpretation, but the semantics of the messages is as if pre-given in a 
limited number of stereotypes and it does not allow exchange of new information. 
One pervasive theme in Estonian extreme-right online communication is the idea 
that the Estonian nation is facing existential dangers, and that national sovereignty 
and cultural identity are threatened by hostile foreign forces. An autocommunicative 
selection of information takes place, which is predominantly open to associations that 
the potential addressee already previously knows (Madisson, Ventsel 2016). Members 
of extreme-right communities do not tend to be immersed in fundamentally different 
lines of thought. This semantic shift becomes possible because a new code is added, 
and through that code the previously known information is given a new meaning. So 
for example, we can observe how those previously outlined themes are interpreted 
according to an economic code (“migrants are threatening the sustainability of our 
country because they are taking our jobs and they encumber economic growth”), 
a social code (“providing the social benefits to strangers is jeopardizing the social 
welfare of Estonians”) or a cultural code (“they wear burqas and aggressively spread 
their religion and this is dangerous for Estonian culture”). If a new code is added, 
the autocommunicative framework of associations that organizes various extreme 
interpretations is confirmed once again. It widens and deepens the cluster of reasons 
why the national spirit and the white race can be presented as being under serious 
threat (Madisson, Ventsel 2015, 2016).
Unquestionably, such echo-chamber communication is not exclusively characteristic 
of supporters of the extreme-right world view. Camelia Gradinaru (2013: 101) has 
indicated that in some cases constant and intensive social media communication 
with homogeneous peers can lead to the construction of a deficient looking-glass 
self because the reflection does not take into consideration novel perspectives or true 
oppositions. Contrary to popular expectation, online communication very often does 
not facilitate deliberative discussions and it is important to note that if a persistent 
member of an echo chamber described above encounters opposing perspectives, 
his/her views will not become more moderate, but rather more radically polarized 
(Wojcieszak 2010: 645–647; Wojcieszak, Price 2010: 331). 
We believe that this kind of enclosed meaning-making can be explained with 
the help of the concept of autocommunication. Firstly, we shall explicate antithetical 
modelling as one of the dominants of hermetic autocommunication.  
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Antithesis as the dominant of enclosing autocommunication 
Permanent members of the extreme-right online communities usually cannot perceive 
the relative nature of values and norms, nor can they accept the plurality of different 
ways of interpretation and viewpoints. In those vernacular webs, information is 
frequently created according to an antithetical model that separates the world into 
two camps in a binary opposition: moral and immoral, beneficial and harmful, friends 
and enemies. According to Lotman, binary thinking does not even consider the relative 
equality of the concerned parties. Even if acknowledging such equality may not mean 
admitting the opponent’s right to the truth, it would at least mean admitting his/her 
right to existence (Lotman 2007: 26). In the context of the European Refugee Crisis, 
such logic sticks out in a quite noticeable manner. To put it briefly, it contrasts moral, 
righteous, principled, rational, and stable indigenous Estonians (but also other defenders 
of, in general, the Nordic/white race and/or European nation states) with decadent, 
deceitful, two-faced, greedy, unnatural groups (e.g., the Estonian political establishment, 
the structures of the European Union, people who support liberal democracy and the 
rights of minorities, as well as the mainstream media and educational system) that use 
hysterical and emotional rhetoric and slander to ridicule nationalist views. That kind 
of antithetical logic is strongly expressed in the following quotation, where different 
groups who represent views dissimilar from “ours” are understood as enemies: 
[…] it doesn’t matter if this is done because people are brainwashed useful idiots, 
or because they are stupidly idealistic, or bribed, or because they have a mission to 
advocate their “progressive” ideology, or because of the clear and evil destructive 
hatred against their own nation and country – this kind of bollocks about the 
refugees, tolerance and openness and other such progressive phenomena is criminal 
and those who are talking about it are ENEMIES of the country and the nation, they 
are basically preparing the same for us that was done recently in Paris.9
To be sustainable, such antithetical modelling needs the presence of evil, and thus 
representations expressing the dangerousness of the enemy are constantly added 
(Lotman 2007: 40). It is quite common that postings talk about an ongoing violent 
stifling of conservative voices,10 existential danger to nation-states11 or even killing 
9 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/mart-metsalalt-suureparane-raadiosaade.
html; all translations from the Estonian-language blogs are ours, M.-L. M., A. V. Th e reference 
is to the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015.
10 http://koobas.net/2015/04/17/repressiivne-sundsallivus/; http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/
2015/04/matti-ilves-tulistamisest-rootsis-ja.html; http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/
anti-poolamets-juku-kalle-raid-avaldas.html. 
11 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/raivo-orgusaar-vastuseis-eesti.html; 
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/matti-ilves-on-alustatud-eesti.html; 
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/04/helme-tegelikult-pole-eestis-mingit.html. 
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people whose opinions are opposed to the “blind toleration of everything”;12 talk of a 
white genocide is also widespread.13 The expression of these threats can be illustrated 
by the following: 
In reality it functions as a gradual supersession of the local population and also 
helps to declare that all the people who criticize it are Nazis. It is a systematic 
destruction, not tolerance, when all kind of obsolete excuses are used as a basis 
for loosening the citizenship policy and rules regarding residence permits The 
tolerance is a code word for White genocide.14
It is important to emphasize that the antithetical enemy is often constructed as a 
symmetrical mirror image of one’s own structures, yet carries a negative sign (Lotman, 
Uspensky 1978: 220). It is quite typical that the projection precedes the mirror-projection, 
i.e., firstly our problems are ascribed to them and then a mirror-projective antithesis is 
created that opposes their problems to the 0-feature, i.e. the lack of problems in our 
structure (Lepik 2007: 82). That kind of signification is strongly present in the postings in 
our case study, and we noticed that the ideological opponents (i.e. the Estonian political 
and cultural elite and the EU) were blamed for intolerance, extremism, racism and 
Nazism, and also for the persecution of minorities.15 E.g. one author writes:
Heil, Sutrops16! Heil! Heil, Anti-fascists! Heil, our Nazi-hunters! Heil – aren’t we 
efficient protectors of the rule of law! Heil to us! Heil – we denounce Nazism! 
But do you want to see extremists whose mouths are frothing with anger? Then 
look into the mirror! Of course, you have the power and the force to smash the 
12 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/jaan-hatto-enesehavituse-ilu.html; 
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/07/juri-kukk-eestimaa-anno-domini-2030.html;  
http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/03/je-suis-ekre-sona-ja-mottevabaduse-ning.html. 
13 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/mis-sunnitab-breivikuid-dialoogi.html; http://
rahvuslik.blogspot.com.ee/2015/09/peavooluajakirjandus-eriti-delfi-ohutab.html#more; 
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/09/peavooluajakirjandus-eriti-delfi -ohutab.html.
14  http://koobas.net/2015/04/03/teretulemast-rootsi/. Based on the same comment it appears 
that what is being criticized here is a vision of tolerance and cultural enrichment ascribed to 
communists and Marxists.  
15 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/04/mart-helme-vaadake-toele-silma-arge.html; 
http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/06/pole-vahet-kas-rahvas-havitatakse.html#more.  
16  On 7 March 2015  Urmas Sutrop, the director of the Institute of the Estonian Language, 
published an opinion article that concentrated on the online sources of the Estonian extreme right 
and the Nazi mentality of the members of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE), 
see: http://epl.delfi .ee/news/arvamus/urmas-sutropi-uued-faktid-ekrest-salaparane-metapeedia-
uhendab-valge-rassi-ulemvoimu-ja-aarmusparempoolsuse-eest-voitlejaid?id=70959527.  
He received furious feedback from EKRE but also from extreme-right bloggers. 
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mirror for you don’t like the sickening Nazi face that is emerging from there. Yes, 
you have the power and the force. But what will it change? The new society that 
you are creating is a society of fear where dissidents can be labelled and beaten with 
impunity, eventually even killed. Is that what you are trying to achieve with your 
hysteria?17
Such rhetoric allows authors on the extreme right to position themselves as moral victims 
who are surrounded by hostile enemies (Madisson, Ventsel 2015, 2016; Madisson 2016). 
Also, it allows countering the potential accusations from the opponents even before they 
are articulated because the enemies are discredited by describing them as having typical 
characteristics that are usually attributed to far-right extremists. 
Lotman and Uspensky (1978: 221) stress that semiotic unities, organized by 
antithetic modelling, may often be striving towards isolation from external impact. In 
a borderline situation, these kinds of semiotic unities may interpret all other unities 
that exhibit different associations and representations as dangerous structures of the 
enemy (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 220).  We detected the belief that the undermining 
and devastating impact of the enemy can be avoided by ceasing all possible contact 
with it. This tendency towards enclosure is expressed in the following blog posting: 
If securing the borders and keeping the immigrants out of the country is a 
guarantee of security and wealth then we have to do it, and sacrifice the comfort 
of travelling without a passport. My point of view is that it’s better to be closed 
than dead.18 
In the context of online communication concentrating on the present refugee crisis, we 
can notice a rapid growth of Islamophobia.19 Islam (in extreme-right representations it 
is frequently equated with Islamism) is very often understood as a barbaric and violent 
system of beliefs that tolerates slaughtering and raping of non-believers.20 Also, people 
are worrying about the effective recruiting techniques and the propaganda of Islam. 
It is assumed that soon Europe and the whole Western world will be dominated by 
Islam, which is jeopardizing nation states and their traditions and values. For example, 
consider the following:
17 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/03/je-suis-ekre-sona-ja-mottevabaduse-ning.html.  
18 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/martin-helme-parem-suletud-kui-surnud.html. 
19 It is worth noting that our previous observations (2012–2014) indicated quite a low pro-
portion of Islamophobic content but since 2015 it has become a rising dominant. We have 
noticed the process of importing the Islamophobic content form Scandinavian web-sites; 
among other issues there is also a tendency to draw parallels with the ideas presented in Brei-
vik’s Manifesto, e.g. the Eurabia conspiracy.
20 http://bhruzzland.balanss.ee/toeline-islam (vt. ka. http://bhruzzland.balanss.ee/naabrid/
891-luehidalt-07-12-2015-taeiendatav).
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There is nothing so disgusting as the fact that the patriots of our own country have 
to march under the protection of the police, while immigrants, Muslims and left-
wing filth are howling. That filth is growing more and more daring in Estonia and 
it’s publicly mocking nationalists and their ventures. ISLAM IS A PLAGUE WHICH 
DESTROYS EVERYTHING THAT IS DEAR TO AND INNATE FOR US.21
Peet Lepik (2007: 87, 91) has pointed out that antithesis can function as a trigger of 
autocommunication. In vernacular web of the extreme right it functions as an additional 
code, originating from cultural memory, that re-organizes the primary semantics of the 
message. The ordinary meaning of the message will become quite irrelevant in the light of 
the antithesis. The antithesis evokes the so-called wider or more significant dimension of 
meaningfulness, the single example of the dangerous acts of the enemy is less important 
than the fact that it confirms the cultural stereotype (Lepik 2007: 80; Madisson, Ventsel 
2016): their wicked and immoral nature and our morality. The particular deviations from 
the norm (e.g. “Islamic propaganda”, “howling immigrants, Muslims and left-wing filth”) 
are not perceived as being as significant as the fact that the antithesis connects previously 
existing preconceptions and cultural frames with new contexts and associations. The 
aforementioned examples indicate that there is one cause of the processes/events that 
are threatening Estonia and European nations: Islam.  
 
Orientation towards normative texts 
as a dominant of closed autocommunication 
There are also other dominants that facilitate enclosing autocommunicative processes 
besides antithesis in the meaning-making of the extreme right. One important tendency 
is the emergence of hermetic strategies of association. Umberto Eco has pointed out 
that hermetic communication is directed by a powerful mechanism of analogy which 
is almost unstoppable once started. Every time when a new analogy is discovered, 
it, in turn, indicates a new analogy etc. In this kind of interpretation the criterion of 
similarity is established quite loosely and it is often assumed that the meaning of a sign 
is actually indicating a hidden meaning. Thus, in hermetic semiosis, the interpreter 
starts to look for secret motives behind all kinds of events and phenomena (Eco 1990: 
163–166). One important principle of hermetic semiosis is that when two things are 
similar, the former is a sign of the latter and vice versa (Eco 1990: 164). That kind of 
modelling, based on the mechanism of analogy, has an important role in extreme-right 
echo-chamber communication. In the context of the European migration wave, the 
extreme-right vernacular web creates analogies between very dissimilar events and 
phenomena, for instance: 
21 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/inglismaal-arreteeriti-mees-kes.html. 
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Actually, such large-scale arrangements as the shootings in Paris, the blasting of 
the twin towers in New York and the explosion of bombs in London cannot be 
organized without the silent consent and/or contribution of the authorities and 
the secret services. All of them are separate parts of one and the same plan.22 
Such a plan is understood to serve one main goal which one author describes as follows: 
“What starts to happen is Europe is a total madhouse. Actually, it is one part of the 
eradication of the white race and nation states [...]”23, “[...] where the refugees that are 
predominantly Muslims, are flooding the European Union”24. The principle of analogy 
sees “the extreme liberals and extreme leftists: the Reform Party, the Social Democrats 
and the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union”25 as promoters of this plan, but it also includes 
agents that, at first sight, seem incompatible in this context, e.g. ecofascists26, 
[…] sexual Marxism and cultural Marxism didn’t attack capital but they turned 
to soft values. According to Marcuse, gays, lesbians and radical feminists 
were supposed to be the avant-garde of the new social revolution. Those were 
the groups that the capitalists despised; and at a certain point also the mass of 
immigrants and other minorities that flowed into Europe was added to them. 
White traditional heterosexuals were declared evil.27 
It is quite common to draw parallels with Soviet authorities, e.g. there are references 
to “KGB agents”28, “new Chekists”29, “new June communists and new deporters”30; 
“radical enemies of the people”31; “cultural communists”32, etc. According to Lotman 
22 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/pagulased-kui-terroristide-inimkilp.html. 
Our emphasis, M.-L. M., A. V.
23 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/allan-sarri-mis-kuradi-transseksuaal.html. 
24 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/matti-ilves-euroopa-liit-peab-vastu.html. 
25 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/06/pole-vahet-kas-rahvas-havitatakse.html#more.  
26 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/03/je-suis-ekre-sona-ja-mottevabaduse-ning.html. 
27 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/kaasaegse-sotsiaaldemokraatia-hada-ja.html. 
28 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/eesti-on-muudetud-politseiriigiks-kus.html. 
29  Chekists were the members of Cheka i.e. the Emergency Committee, the fi rst of a succession 
of Soviet state security organizations, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheka. 
30 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/06/pole-vahet-kas-rahvas-havitatakse.html#more. 
‘June communists’ is a colloquial term that refers to the people who in June 1940 collaborated 
with the Estonian Communist Party and the authorities of the Soviet Union in organizing 
the coup that lead to the incorporation of Estonia in the Soviet Union on 6 August 1940. 
‘Deporters’ refers to the people who conducted mass repressions – the largest deportations in 
Estonia took place on 14 June 1941 (ca 10,000 persons were deported) and on 25–29 March 
1949 (more than 20,000 persons were deported).
31 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/03/je-suis-ekre-sona-ja-mottevabaduse-ning.html. 
32 http://koobas.net/2015/04/03/teretulemast-rootsi/.    
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(2002a: 2647–2648) this structural relation, based on homomorphism, allows us to 
recognize the signs of one and the same phenomenon in different manifestations; and 
to see a unitary object instead of the different objects of the same class. In our case, 
an analogy is established between different actors and the unpleasant events that they 
seem to have caused in the past and will cause in the future.  
One central characteristic of this kind of meaning-making is the tendency to 
identify with the normative text or an aggregate of normative texts (Lotman, Uspensky 
1978: 218). In meaning-making that is oriented towards texts, the self views itself as a 
sum of precedents, cases of use and texts (Lotman 2010: 61), and the normative (“the 
correct”) is equated with the existence of that semiotic unity. In Estonian extreme-
right online communication that is aggregated around mapping the refugee crisis 
(various threats that it is causing and possible solutions for softening its presumed 
devastating impacts) we can observe two types of normative texts that are organizing 
the interpretation. 
     (1) Firstly, there are texts that exist in a particular form and it is not difficult to 
ascertain their authorship. One of the most popular texts that is constantly referred to 
undoubtedly is the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. For example, one author 
remarks: “Our nationalism is the nationalism of a small nation, it isn’t directed against 
others (as is the chauvinism of big nations), but it rather aims for survival, and this 
is what our Constitution obliges us to do”.33  Extreme right-wing authors treat the 
Constitution as a prescriptive text that justifies certain actions, e.g.: 
[t]he Constitution states that Estonia is still an independent country, and an 
independent country does not follow the instructions from some foreign countries 
or private enterprises. There are no refugee quotas in our Constitution, thus there 
is nothing to talk about. [...] Those who have never supported Estonian culture 
should not start talking about multiculturalism34. 
Another author claims that „The Constitution states that the problems with national 
importance are: firstly, the extinction of the nation and its mass emigration into 
exile for survival; and secondly, cultural decadence.”35 Polarizing and closed 
autocommunication is also indicated by the dominance of the dimension of essentialist 
values that does not explicate the particularities of the ideas proposed. So Estonian 
culture is predominantly associated with skin colour and racial identity, e.g. one author 
points out: 
33 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/03/je-suis-ekre-sona-ja-mottevabaduse-ning.html; 
http://bhruzzland.balanss.ee/isamaa/ensv-ev/437-euroopa-liitu-ei-huvita-tartu-rahuleping-
ega-meie-riiklik-vaeaerikus). 
34 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/kivisildnik-valitsus-vahetab-rahva.html.  
35 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/kivisildnik-mis-on-meile-kasulikum-kas.html. 
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Also, the Estonian Constitution considers the main purpose of the Estonian 
state to be the maintenance of the Estonian state, people, culture and language 
through the ages. Those who say that the nation doesn’t have a skin colour 
unfortunately have inadequate knowledge. Any encyclopedia will clearly say that 
Estonians belong to the white, Caucasian race. [...] an Estonian with black skin is 
as impossible as a bearded woman.36 
The endeavours of cultural self-description that articulate the positive features of 
Estonian culture are almost missing in these kinds of postings; they only occur as 
severe opposition to structures that are declared to be alien. If cultural identity is 
defined by skin colour, it remains unclear how Estonian culture differs from other 
“white” cultures.
There is also a tendency to refer to certain texts by certain authors, mostly anti-
utopias (e.g. 1984, Fahrenheit 45137 and The Gulag Archipelago38). Those texts function 
as cautionary examples of the socio-cultural decadence that will emerge soon because 
of political correctness and a senseless toleration of everything. For instance, one 
author notes: “You walk down the street and there are shootings and people are 
dropping down. You have to thank God for still being alive! Does it sound familiar? 
That kind of world was described in the book 1984 by George Orwell who was well 
informed about the secret plans of the self-appointed rulers of the world.”39 
(2) Secondly, the other widespread type of text is related to the layer of collective 
memory-texts of the community. This includes the general text of victimhood which in 
the Estonian context is often associated with the 700-years-long serfdom, deportations 
and the Soviet occupation. Extreme-right interpreters often stress that they see the 
signs of a continuation of such persecution in our daily politics. In order to map 
important phenomena, and to articulate future scenarios, the authors often turn to 
their own collective memory. Thus, previously existing associations, dominant in the 
vernacular web of the extreme right, tend to be amplified and the polarization in 
respect to the so-called outer world seems to be aggravating further. Extreme right-
wing interpretations often see analogies between the European Union and the Soviet 
Union. For example, one author writes: 
36 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/06/pole-vahet-kas-rahvas-havitatakse.html#more. 
37 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/09/matti-ilves-laanes-levib-intellektaalne.html. 
38 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/jaan-hatto-enesehavituse-ilu.html. 
39 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/pagulased-kui-terroristide-inimkilp.html. 
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At first they adopted in their PR-arsenal the Soviet Union’s idea of an omnipotent 
empire; they also took over the model of the brotherly family where Germans, 
Greeks and Poles are equally important. The European Union was supposed to be 
the synonym of a fortunate super-empire.40 
Another important frame, directing the generation of analogies, is the New World 
Order (NWO) conspiracy theory. It enables a connection between topical daily events 
and the spiteful global and local state authorities, the biased mainstream media and 
various education institutions that are said to be contributing to the brainwashing of 
ordinary citizens (see Madisson, Ventsel 2016; Madisson 2016). The NWO conspiracy 
is understood as a systemic plot against Estonian culture and the Estonian nation in 
general. For example, one author remarks: 
[…] the deportation of Estonians with the trigger of poverty has been successful, 
it has created the preconditions for the mass immigration, the land is socially 
burned, the lebensraum41 suits illegal immigrants and the new wave of colonists.42 
The other outlines: “The deportation of Estonians based on the commands of Moscow 
or the importation of other nations on the conditions of Brussels both have a deleterious 
outcome – one nation is becoming an unsustainable minority in its homeland”.43
Also, the second type includes the stereotypical memory-text of black men who are 
prone to commit crimes, including sexual assaults and rape. Different authors write of 
a massive wave of rapes that has taken place in the Nordic countries44 and it is often 
argued that local people are afraid to move about in their neighbourhoods and that 
the police are unable to patrol in the districts of immigrants. It is relevant to note that 
the mechanism of homomorphism allows the interpretation of different expressions/
texts as analogous with one another and so an analogy relation is created with Islamists 
who incite “people to holy violence – murder, rape, and slaughter”.45 
40 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/kaasaegse-sotsiaaldemokraatia-hada-ja.html. 
In this quote, ’they’ refers to the European Union. 
41 Lebensraum is a term, associated with the rhetoric of Nazi Germany, it refers to a territory 
believed to be “necessary for national existence or economic self-suffi  ciency”; see http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/lebensraum. 
42 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/kivisildnik-valitsus-vahetab-rahva.html. 
43 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/05/toomas-roosileht-eesti-rahvusel-on.html; 
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/anti-poolamets-juku-kalle-raid-avaldas.html; 
http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com/2015/08/pagulasprobleemi-reaalne-lahendus.html#more. 
44 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/jaan-hatto-enesehavituse-ilu.html;
http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/norras-ei-ole-koik-korras-97.html. 
45 http://bhruzzland.balanss.ee/toeline-islam; http://bhruzzland.balanss.ee/naabrid/891-
luehidalt-07-12-2015-taeiendatav. 
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Culture that identifies itself as a collection of texts is guided by the idea that everything 
opposing its views also has specific expression – but a wrong (incorrect) expression 
(Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 219). That kind of tendency is strongly present in the process 
of naming. The act of giving a name to a communication partner is equivalent with taking 
him/her to my world of meanings, it requires coding him/her with my code and it implies 
giving him/her a place in my worldview. In communication, dominated by antithetical 
modelling, the processes of naming acquire a specific form, i.e. the name of the objects 
must reflect their nature (see also Madisson, Ventsel 2012). In case of mapping the 
European refugee crisis, a significant problem of naming emerges because it is the first step 
that is directing the interpreter to a certain frame of meaning. We can repeatedly observe 
postings that advocate calling a spade a spade. For instance, one author writes: “Lately, 
the media has talked much about the so-called “refugees” and “emigrees”, especially in the 
context of  the crisis that is taking place on the Mediterranean [...]”.46 It is also pointed out: 
“The fact is that the majority of those immigrants are not refugees but migrants for the 
social benefits, whose main destinations are countries where it is easier to conduct living 
that is financed by social assistance.”47 Another posting states that: 
as most of the “refugees” are illegal aliens who have no documents, the majority 
of them are young and strong men, and the fees for a boat journey are rather 
high, there is reason to believe that actually we are facing economic migrants or 
undercover “ambassadors” of the Islamic State.48 
The use of inverted commas is widespread and this is usually done in order to ridicule 
the phrasing used by the opponents or even to demonstrate the deceptiveness of the 
ideas that are spreading in the mainstream media. The strategy of naming is also a 
mechanism by which analogies are created between different events and actors (see 
the aforementioned ‘occupation’, ‘migrant’, ‘colonizer’ which all carry references to the 
Soviet past of Estonia).  
Robert Glenn Howard has elaborated the concept of vernacular authority that 
nowadays mainly emerges in the context of online communication. Although tradition 
is non-institutional, it always bears in itself a reference to authority as it determines 
a cluster of potential responses that permit individuals to make choices in everyday 
situations. Unlike institutional authority, however, vernacular authority is generally 
present when an individual trusts a statement precisely because it has not been brought 
to focus by an institutional authority, be it a formal institution such as the church, a 
media corporation, etc. In short, ‘vernacular’ can dialectically be defined as something 
46 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/04/koobas-miks-nn-pogenikud-ei-lahe.html. 
47 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/08/pagulaste-monus-elu-saksamaal.html; our em -
phasis M.-L. M., A. V. 
48 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/rahvas-andis-roivase-kabinetile-selge.html. 
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distinct from ‘institutional’ (Howard 2011: 7–10). It is important to note that the 
opposition to the mainstream spheres of information and clear mapping of right and 
wrong are important constituents of extreme-right communication. We can note that 
kind of attitude in the following posting:
It is becoming increasingly more evident that Estonian mainstream journalism 
has started to engage in brainwashing that is as disgusting as the brainwashing 
in the Soviet press, with the Pravda at its forefront. There was only one truth 
and those who were against it were called counter-revolutionaries, bourgeoisies, 
reactionaries, etc that meant unsuitable filth for the new authorities.49 
So the web of extreme-right thinkers distrusts the mainstream media and rather values 
the so-called alternative sources. Dominant journalism is often associated with state 
authorities and it is believed that mainstream channels are intentionally spreading 
information that is existentially dangerous to the nation state and to traditional values 
(e.g. the propaganda of sexual minorities, the ideas of aggressive multiculturalism, 
etc.). The vernacular authority is based on collective memory-texts (e.g. the text of 
victimhood, the idea of a white Nordic race, the romantic narrative of being successors 
of the Vikings, etc) that are interpreted from a certain perspective. It is also influenced 
by authors who present ideas that are strongly opposed to the dominant discourses. 
That kind of communication, oriented towards the “correct” texts, has a clearly 
autocommunicative nature because its meaning-making is encapsulated in formerly 
existing associations. It is looking for self-confirmation in normative texts, and in 
constant opposition to mainstream viewpoints. That kind of autocommunication may 
try to avoid interaction and dialogue with external spheres. Peet Lepik (2007: 89) 
has indicated that autocommunicative processes foster the transformation of texts 
into meta-texts. According to Lepik, autocommunication comprises in itself both a 
reflection of the object level as well as guidelines for interpreting it. Metatexts rise 
onto a higher level than object-level texts, thus functioning as examples of the rule 
(Lepik 2007: 91). As indicated above, the extreme-right webs tend to interpret the 
ongoing events in light of the texts of cultural memory (the text of victimhood, the 
NWO conspiracy theory, 1984), and also rely on these texts in the articulation of their 
scenarios of a decadent future (fatal political correctness, a complete disappearance 
of the freedom of speech, cultural and physical extinction of Estonians, etc.). Some 
memory-texts (popular interpretations of anti-utopias) function as cautionary 
examples of a future which could be avoided only if radically new courses of action 
were to be chosen – the traitorous nature of the state authorities and the European 
Union publicly acknowledged, the flow of migrants strictly impeded, and the spread 
49 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/09/peavooluajakirjandus-eriti-delfi -ohutab.html.
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of Islam stopped in Western countries). Although Lotman (2010: 62) points out that 
the type of culture that is oriented towards texts does not actively strive towards self-
descriptive processes, it is important to note that the aspect that texts are transformed 
into metatexts gives them a prescriptive and normative function. This function is 
connected with a mechanism of identification that eliminates differences and brings 
texts closer to standards and norms. These kinds of normative texts present and teach 
a certain behaviour and accepted values (Lotman 2010: 61).
 
 The phatic dominant of closed autocommunication 
As outlined above, extreme-right vernacular webs often function as autocommunicative 
echo chambers in which the receiver of the message in principle already knows its 
content. In many aspects, such communication is organized by meaning templates 
and stereotypes that exist in the communal memory of the extreme-right community. 
Even if the messages of this vernacular web comprise new pieces of information (e.g. 
new factors, daily events, formerly unknown agents), they usually become significant 
through relations with previously existing frameworks of interpretation. Thus we can 
say that the degree of new meanings of this communication is rather low. On the 
other hand, it is important to note that the low semantic value is often compensated 
for by a strong potential for creating communal ties. Continuous echo-chamber 
communication increases communal memory (including the repertoire of common 
references) and reinforces the rhetorical frames that enable justification of shared 
views. Also, it usually guarantees the feeling of security and motivation for future 
interactions because the messages, constructed in a “correct or right” manner, ensure 
a positive feedback loop (Jamieson, Cappella 2008: 77, 240). In such echo-chamber 
communication, it is worth distinguishing one more dominant, that is based on the 
phatic language function elaborated on by Roman Jakobson. 
According to Jakobson (1976: 113) the phatic function is directed at contact, 
“a physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and the 
addressee, enabling both of them to enter and stay in communication”. A classic 
example of phatic communication is the situation in which somebody is checking if the 
telephone line is working. It is important to note that for Jakobson the contact is not 
only limited to physical channels but he also stresses the significance of establishing 
and maintaining a psychological connection between the addresser and the addressee. 
Examples of creating psychological contact are situations in which the interlocutors 
try to attract each other’s attention or to check if the partner is generally focusing on 
the particular interaction (Jakobson 1976: 113). Our observation shows that there is a 
significant proportion of phatic messages in extreme-right vernacular web. 
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One important aspect of extreme-right communication is expressing being in the 
loop regarding the ideas and activities of like-minded thinkers. Zeynep Tufekci (2008: 
556) has pointed out that unlike face-to-face communication, online communication 
allows one to maintain social ties with other members of the community even 
across vast differences in distance and time. The members of social networking sites 
employ a lot of phatic information in their semi-public messages: e.g. it is possible to 
identify the members who have the status of a friend; also, it is easy to detect patterns 
constituted by commenting, sharing and liking the content of certain users. That kind 
of phatic communication reflects clear communicational hierarchies and establishes 
the dominance of some contacts over others. Thus, the observation of phatic 
communication gives valuable information about group belonging and social status 
(Tufekci 2008: 547–548). In the extreme-right vernacular web we found a number of 
postings the main content of which included references to other sources, expressing 
radically nationalistic or anti-immigrant attitudes. The most popular sources were the 
Facebook groups “EI PAGULASMASSIDELE” [“NO TO THE REFUGEE MASSES”], 
“Ei pagulastele” [“No to refugees”], “Estonian Anonymous” (as well as its YouTube 
channel); the nationalist news portals “Uued uudised” [“New News”], “Objektiiv” 
[“Objective”] (as well as its YouTube  channel); and the homepages of Nõmme Radio 
and the Club of Nationalists of Tallinn.  
The sources referred to often overlap (i.e. there emerge certain authoritative 
authors and quotations) and there is a trend of frequent cross-referencing between 
different extreme-right websites (Madisson, Ventsel 2015). Sometimes the postings 
consist of Estonian translations or summaries of texts first published in English,50 
Finnish51 or Swedish52. In the context of the postings focusing on the European refugee 
crisis, we noticed a tendency to express support and approval of the activities of the 
extreme right and the right-wing populist parties, e.g. Estonian bloggers often refer 
to the web pages, YouTube channels and social media posts of the National Front 
(especially the activities of Marine Le Pen), the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats, 
the UK Independence Party. They often share the content of international anti-Islam 
and/or extreme right movements like Pegida, the European National Front and Smash 
Cultural Marxism. Also, the extreme-right vernacular web presents an awareness of 
the actions of the right-wing populist anti-immigration parties: Eesti Konservatiivne 
Rahvaerakond (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia), Eesti Iseseisvuspartei (the 
Estonian Independence Party), Rahva Ühtsuse Erakond (the Party of People’s Unity). 
It is noteworthy that from time to time there are also references to the activities of 
Christian institutions, e.g. occasional posting of articles published in the web magazine 
50 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/matti-ilves-legaliseeritakse-valgete.html. 
51 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/jaan-hatto-enesehavituse-ilu.html. 
52 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/lahendused-on-olemas-lahendused-on.html. 
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Meie Kirik [Our Church], the Facebook postings of some Estonian church figures and 
certain broadcasts of the Christian radio channel Kuressaare Pereraadio [Family Radio 
of Kuressaare].
The linguist John Laver, who has developed Jakobson’s ideas further, stresses that 
in phatic communication the information is presented in an indexical rather than in 
a referential mode; primarily, it demonstrates the acceptance/non-acceptance of the 
communication partner (Laver 1975: 336). Creating reliable contact is often based 
on the activation of the associations of a common memory. Lotman (2002b: 171) 
has indicated that in order to establish an intimate atmosphere in communication, 
local semantics which is connected with the formation of a “local/domestic” lexicon, 
is heavily used. In some cases, the value of a certain message increases when it is 
incomprehensible to outsider groups. In our observation we noticed the expression 
‘pederallalla’53 as an example of this kind of intimate lexicon. It is common in extreme-
right blogs, but also in Facebook postings and newspaper commentaries; one author 
even offers a definition – “fag-like thinking that stresses careless enjoyment of life that 
is free of responsibilities (faggots, you know, don’t have children)”54. Another similar 
phrase, widely used in extreme-right circles is ‘lilla-roosa udu’55, which signifies the 
liberal democratic or social democratic rhetoric that is dominant in mainstream media. 
It is worth noting that if the same content is repeated via different sign systems 
it becomes more memorable and significant (Ojamaa, Torop 2015: 63), for the same 
text or text-element is not only actuating the coherence of the different versions of the 
same text but also the medium-specific features of the previous repetitions of the text 
(Ojamaa, Torop 2015: 73).56 In the context of the postings concerning the European 
Refugee Crisis the most repeated text concerns the genocide of the white race and is 
mediated via diagrams,57 films and YouTube videos,58 opinion articles,59 cartoons or 
photo collages,60 and pictorial texts depicting explicit acts of violence61.
53 Th e literal translation of ‘pede’ is ‘faggot’ and ‘rallallaa’ is a non-lexical vocable frequently 
used in Estonian children’s songs.
54 http://rahvuslik.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/mis-sunnitas-breiviku-dialoogi.html#more. 
55 Th e literal translation of ‘lilla-roosa udu’ is ‘purple-pink fog’, sometimes also just ‘pink fog’ is 
used; see http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/09/kivisildnik-sotsialistliku.html. 
56 Jakobson mostly deals with linguistic examples, but he also emphasizes that “this pragmatic 
approach to language must lead mutatis mutandis to an analogous study of the other semiotic 
systems: with which of these or other functions are they endowed, in what combinations and 
in what hierarchical order” (Jakobson 1971b: 703).
57 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/11/mis-sunnitab-breivikuid-dialoogi.html.
58 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/10/white-race-genocide-valge-rassi.html. 
59 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/08/getter-suup-moslemipogenike-vastuvott.html. 
60 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/06/laupaevased-pildid_27.html. 
61 http://rahvuslane.blogspot.com.ee/2015/12/heldur-paulson-immigrantidest-ja_2.html. 
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Several studies focusing on extreme-right online communication have outlined 
that in order to avoid unwanted audiences and to establish a group feeling there is a 
tendency to use various kinds of secret codes of radical nationalists. For example, some 
numerical codes and acronyms are used (e.g. 88,62 28,63 RAHOWA,64 and PWA65) and 
occasional fragments of particular in-group texts (song lyrics, aphorisms, slogans etc.) 
are repeated (see Hale 2012: 349; Siibak 2012; Simi, Futrell 2006: 133–134; Madisson, 
Ventsel 2015: 12).  Eco (1995: 74) has noted that extreme-right movements favour using 
shortened vocabulary and neologisms. Exchanging that kind of phatic information is 
significant because it indicates the potential acceptance of the interlocutor as a valuable 
communication partner (Radovanovic, Ragnedda 2012: 12).66 
The tendency to reduce words, and the transformation of words into signs (i.e. 
indexes of the words) that are understandable only to a receiver who already knows 
the text is, according to Lotman (2000: 26), a special feature of the autocommunicative 
system. That tendency is present in the phatic communication of the extreme-right 
vernacular web described here. Such phatic communication may seem redundant at 
first because it is based on the repetition of the same content, but it is significant in 
establishing and affirming social ties. 
Conclusion
This article focused on the specifics of meaning-making of polarized echo-chamber 
communication. The framework of semiotics of culture helped us to describe the 
central characteristics of hermetic communication and to explain its wider cultural 
function. Additionally, the paper demonstrated that the concept of autocommunication 
is useful in exploring meaning-making that is predominantly reproducing cultural 
stereotypes and has a generally closed nature. In the following we shall briefly compare 
enclosed communication of the extreme right with the main features of dialogic 
communication.  
62 ‘88’ refers to the Nazi greeting “Heil Hitler” as H is the eighth letter of the alphabet
63 ‘28’ refers to the international extreme-right movement Blood and Honour, as B is the 
second and H is the eighth letter of alphabet.
64 Th e phrase ‘RAHOWA’ is an abbreviation of ‘Racial Holy War’. 
65 ‘PWA’ stands for the expression ‘Preserve White Aryans’; P.W.A. is the name of a punk band 
of Estonian skinheads. 
66 Radovanovic, Danica; Ragnedda, Massimo 2012. Small talk in the Digital Age: Making 
sense of phatic posts. #MSM2012 2nd Workshop on Making Sense of Microposts, 10–13. 
Workshop proceedings available online as CEUR Vol-838, at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-838 #MS 
M2012, April 16, 2012, Lyon, France.
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Our case study concentrated on the example of extreme-right grassroots networks. 
Specifically, we analysed postings that focus on the Refugee Crisis that escalated 
in spring 2015. Our study indicated that extreme-right online communication is 
characterized by closed meaning-making that hinders dialogue. Such hermetic 
meaning-making is guided by antithetical modelling that constructs a strict binary 
opposition between ‘one’s own’ and ‘the alien’. For example, we noticed a strong 
opposition to Muslims, who were considered to be extremely violent and barbaric. 
However, there was also a general opposition to various kinds of social groups and 
institutions that are fitted under the all-encompassing and rather vague umbrella 
term of ‘the organizers of the white genocide’. On the one hand, the antithesis allows 
locating particular events/agents on the grid of shared cultural memory. On the other 
hand, every single example helps to reinforce previously existing associations and thus 
contributes to the polarization of the oppositions. 
Comparing closed communication with open communication presumes dialogic 
interactions between different social groups, and its potential outcome can be socio-
cultural integration. Dialogic communication is framed by formal conditions that, 
ideally, should take into account the facts (versus ignoring them) and future scenarios 
(versus being short-sighted), and consider the interests of others (versus being biased) 
(Offe, Preuss 1991).67 This model is based on the principle of reciprocity that accepts 
the independence of ‘the other’, its self-descriptions etc. By accepting that, ‘the other’ 
is brought into the inner sphere as a meaningful partner of the dialogue. In this case, 
the communication partner is perceived as a cultural other, and the semiotic unity 
itself is opened to changes that are manifested by entering into a dialogue with external 
structures. Mikhail Bakhtin emphasizes that the dialogue is led by the potential 
answer, by the principle of activation that creates a basis for an active response. Active 
understanding establishes a whole range of complex inter-relations, accordances and 
discordances, and comprehension is enriched with increasingly new elements (Bakhtin 
2001: 282). The addressee is never just a passive receiver but the active constructor 
of the utterance of the addresser, i.e. they mutually constitute each other. In dialogic 
communication we see the integration of ‘the I’ and ‘the other’, the old and the new; 
it also favours adopting meta-positions, etc. (see also Raudsepp, Ventsel 2015). In the 
context of the European Migration Crisis it is possible to see the refugees as ‘the other’, 
as a potential source of enrichment of ‘our own’ culture. 
67 In this article Off e and Preuss discuss these conditions in the context of deliberative demo-
cracy. As regards our article, it is not considered important to “measure” the democratic nature 
of particular types of communication; rather, it emeges as more signifi cant to distinguish the 
conditions of opened or closed (autocommunicative) meaning-making. 
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Antithetical modelling is closely related to the other dominant of closed 
autocommunication – the orientation towards the normative (“correct”) texts. This 
is expressed in the tendency of identifying with some texts (e.g. the Constitution, 
especially paragraphs that talk about the obligation of preserving the Estonian nation, 
culture and language) on the level of self-description. Also, it is quite common to draw 
parallels between daily events and/or future affairs and memory texts, e.g. the text 
of victimhood, popular dystopias (1984) and New World Order conspiracy theories. 
Compared to closed communication, dialogic communication is directed outwards. 
Its meaning-making is characterized by an orientation towards the rules and it is 
predominantly focused on content (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 218).  The norms of 
dialogic communication imply that for successful communication the interlocutors 
have to find a common metalanguage which can be used for discussing socially relevant 
topics. According to Roman Jakobson the metalingual function is characterized by the 
orientation towards the rules, the code.68 For example, it is dominant in a situation 
when one communication partner asks the other to explain incomprehensible concepts 
or when interlocutors are trying to reach an agreement about the rules upon which the 
prospective dialogue will be built (Jakobson 1960: 356). In a dialogue, an interaction 
between different viewpoints, conceptual horizons and various social languages will 
occur. 
The third dominant of echo-chamber communication is a high proportion of texts 
with a phatic orientation. In the extreme-right vernacular web the demonstration of 
being up-to-date with the activities of other extreme right nodes, e.g. via sharing 
links, copying or referring to texts from authoritative sources, etc., constitutes a high 
proportion of the content. Also, phatic communication is expressed in the so-called 
intimate lexicon that indicates the status of being an insider, e.g. by exchanging phrases 
such as ‘pederallalla’ and ‘purple-pink fog’ or by using cryptic acronyms or numerical 
codes (Ventsel 2016). Phatic communication is characterized by a low semantic value 
and a significant potentiality of creating or maintaining social ties. 
The opposite of phatic interactions is communication dominated by the referential 
function. According to Jakobson (1960: 353) the referential function is “an orientation 
toward the context”. The precondition for a dialogue is that the interlocutors are 
familiar with the context that is referred to. The adjustment of the limits of an ongoing 
topic, the indication of the contradictions that occur in the partner’s statements etc., 
help to move towards mutual understanding. Thus, open and dialogic communication 
can be defined as a form of meaning-making dominated by the referential and meta-
lingual functions (see Selg 2013).  
68 Jakobson (1976: 115) distinguishes six general functions of language, while stressing that in 
actual communication situations it is possible to observe the co-presence of several functions 
and thus it is advisable to talk about the primary or dominant functions. 
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It is necessary to emphasize that the general characteristics of echo-chamber 
communication are not only limited to extreme-right online communities. 
Undoubtedly it arises to a greater or lesser extent in all kinds of vernacular 
communities. It is very common that people tend to aggregate around the information 
channels that justify and reproduce their views, and in the case of acute social problems 
there often arises polarized communication that hinders interaction with dissimilar 
horizons. The European Refugee Crisis is an intricate topic that raises rigid claims and 
oppositions, and it is clear that in this context we may observe the closed and hermetic 
communication of communities, aggregated around left-wing views: for example, in 
November 2015 a demonstration was organized in the city of Tartu that was called 
“Tartu - intolerant towards intolerance”. Such a naming strategy seems to exclude 
dialogic attitudes and strengthen the formerly existing oppositions.  
Through the co-existence of the three dominants of closed communication 
(the prevalence of the antithetical modelling, an orientation towards texts, and 
phatic communication) autocommunicative meaning-making loses its potential for 
innovation and starts to reproduce polarizing and hermetic meanings. Unlike creative 
autocommunication, closed autocommunication is not able to answer the challenges 
that come from the outside and thus it is trapped in re-affirming and reinforcing 
previously existing associations. The potential of reaching for random explosions of 
meaning as well as the possibility of learning and renewal is significantly reduced in 
hermetic communication. Exploration of that kind of echo-chamber communication 
can shed light on how different niche communities are formed, and it may also help 
to explain why, despite the various interaction possibilities on the World Wide Web, 
vernacular communities are very often characterized by a tendency towards echo- 
chamber communication and an inability to maintain dialogue.69
69 Th is work was supported by the IUT2-44, PUT44 and  the Marie Curie International 
Research Staff  Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework 
Programme (EU-PREACC project). We would also like to thank the reviewer for helpful 
feedback and especially Silvi Salupere whose remarks and comments helped to hone the ideas 
presented in this article. 
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Автокоммуникативное смыслопорождение в онлайн-коммуникации 
эстонских правых экстремистов
Статья рассматривает онлайн-коммуникацию эстонских правых экстремистов, которая 
характеризуется эффектом эхокамеры и ориентирована на закрытость герметического 
смыслопорождения (meaning-making). Теория опирается главным образом на идеи 
семиотики культуры Тартуско-московской школы.
Одна из целей статьи – расширить понимание автокоммуникативных про-
цессов, которые обычно связываются с обучением, познанием и инновациями. 
В статье рассматриваются условия, при которых общение приводит к закрытой, 
репродуцирующей стереотипы и избыточной автокоммуникации. Этими условиями 
являются основанное на антитезах смыслопорождение, ориентация на нормативные 
(«правильные») тексты, а также большая доля фатической функции в общении. Такая 
коммуникация часто приводит к поляризации публичной сферы коммуникационного 
пространства и к уменьшению возможностей для диалога. В статье анализируется 
дискуссия о беженцах, возникшая в правоэкстремистских блогах весной 2015 года.
Autokommunikatiivne tähendusloome Eesti paremäärmuslaste 
online-kommunikatsioonis
Artiklis analüüsitakse eesti paremäärmuslikku online-kommunikatsiooni, mida iseloomustab 
kajakambriefekt ja suletusele orienteeritud hermeetiline tähendusloome.  Teoreetiline raamistik 
toetub ennekõike Tartu-Moskva kultuurisemiootika ideedele.
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Artikli üks eesmärke on avardada arusaamist autokommunikatiivsetest protsessidest, 
mis tavaliselt seostuvad õppimise, taipamise ja uuendusega. Artiklis eristame tingimusi, 
mille esinemise korral suubub suhtlemine suletud, stereotüüpe taastootvasse ja liiase sisuga 
autokommunikatsiooni. Nendeks on antiteesile tuginev tähendusloome, normatiivsete (“õigete”) 
tekstide kogumile suunatus ning faatilise funktsiooni suur osakaal suhtlemises. Niisuguse 
suhtlemisega kaasneb sageli ühiskondliku avaliku kommunikatsiooniruumi polariseerumine 
ja dialoogivõimaluste vähenemine. Juhtumiuuringus analüüsime eesti paremäärmuslike blogide 
vastukaja 2015. aasta kevadel eskaleerunud rändekriisile.
